Search and equilibrium prices: theory and evidence from retail diesel by Cabral, Luís et al.
DISCUSSION 
PAPER
/ /  L U Í S  C A B R A L ,  D O M I N I K  S C H O B E R , 
A N D  O L I V E R  W O L L
/ /  N O . 1 9 - 0 1 8  |  0 5 / 2 0 1 9
Search and Equilibrium Prices: 
Theory and Evidence from  
Retail Diesel
SearchandEquilibriumPrices:
TheoryandEvidence fromRetailDiesel
Lu´ısCabral
NewYorkUniversityandCEPR
DominikSchober
CEER (Zentrum fu¨rEuropa¨ischeWirtschaftsforschung)andKUEichsta¨tt-Ingolstadt
OliverWoll
CEER (Zentrum fu¨rEuropa¨ischeWirtschaftsforschung)
'JSTU7FSTJPO.BSDI
5IJT7FSTJPO.BSDI
Abstract. Weexaminetherelationbetweenconsumersearchandequilibriumpriceswhen
collusionisendogenouslydetermined.Wedevelopatheoreticalmodelandshowthataverage
price isaU-shaped functionofthemeasureofsearchers: pricesarehighestwhenthereare
no searchers (localmonopoly power) or when there aremany searchers (and sellers opt
to collude). We test this predictionwith diesel retail prices inDortmund,Germany. We
estimateaU-shapedrelationwithstatisticalprecisionandae.025/literpricevariationdue
tothevariation inthemeasureofsearchers.
Cabral: Paganelli-Bull Professor of Economics, Stern School of Business, New York University; and
Research Fellow, CEPR; luis.cabral@nyu.edu. Schober: schober@zew.de. Woll: woll@zew.de. We are
grateful to John Asker and to seminar participants at IIOC 2017, APIOC 2017, and EARIE 2018 for
comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.
JEL L1, L4, L5, L9
Keywords Collusion, Cartelization, Fuel Retailing, Search, Competitive Intensity
1. Introduction
Car driving is an integral part of many people’s daily lives; understandably, gasoline prices
are a concern for many drivers. A common complaint, especially in Europe, is that prices
are too high. In addition to taxes, two common “culprits” for high prices are collusion and
imperfect information.
In some cases, collusion has taken the form of explicit cartel agreements. For example,
in 2011 the Brazilian competition policy authority (CADE) investigated various regional
gasoline cartels. Several gas stations were indicted for secret agreements to maintain high
prices.
In other cases, while there is no evidence of an explicit cartel, there are reasons to believe
tacit collusion to be in place: For example, in 2011 Bundeskartellamt, Germany’s Cartel
Oﬃce, conducted an investigation regarding collusive behavior in the German retail gasoline
and diesel market. It concluded that “retail prices of the majority of oﬀ-motorway petrol
stations are higher than they would have been if eﬀective competition had been in place”
(sector inquiry, p. 19). Nevertheless, the Cartel Oﬃce abstained from direct intervention,
arguing that “direct measures by the authority to reduce prices will have little hope of
success” (ibid).
Regarding imperfect information, it is often said that there is considerable price dis-
persion, which makes it diﬃcult for a driver to ﬁnd the lowest-price pump. For example,
at 5pm on May 1st, 2017, diesel prices in Dortmund, Germany, ranged from 49.5 to 60.4
cents per liter (net of taxes). In fact, imperfect information concerns have led competition
authorities such as the Bundeskartellamt to collect and divulge price information.
In this paper, we look at the combined eﬀect of search and collusion in determining
retail prices. We derive a theoretical model of pricing and price search in the tradition of
Varian (1980). We show that, the greater the measure of searchers, the lower the average
competitive equilibrium price. This is not entirely surprising and is in line with previous
theoretical results.
Next we consider the possibility of collusion. Whereas much of the previous literature
on collusion has focused on the feasibility of collusion, our primary focus is on the expected
proﬁtability of collusion. In other words, whereas the previous literature has focused pri-
marily on the incentive constraint (no-deviation from collusive agreement), we focus on
the participation constraint (collusion vs static Nash equilibrium). Our point is relatively
simple: aside from product market revenues and costs, engaging in collusion has a positive
expected cost. This includes the cost of reaching an agreement (explicit collusion), ﬁnding
a focal point (tacit collusion), as well as the ﬁnes or other antitrust penalties in case the
ﬁrm is indicted for collusion. In this context, an increase in the extent of search, by low-
ering equilibrium proﬁts in the no-collusion equilibrium, increases the relative beneﬁt from
collusion, and thus the probability that collusion takes place.
Taken together, the static and collusion eﬀects imply the prediction of a non-monotonic
relation between the extent of search and expected price, speciﬁcally, a relation that is U-
shaped: If there is very little search, then there is no collusion but equilibrium price is high
since, absent the disciplining device of consumer search, sellers enjoy local monopoly power.
By contrast, if many consumers are searchers then, absent collusion, equilibrium price is
very low. This implies that the gains from collusion are high, the likelihood of collusion is
high, and so is average equilibrium price. In sum, theory predicts that average price is high
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if the measure of searchers is either very low or very high.
We test our theoretical predictions with retail diesel fuel data from Germany. Our
basic regression has price as a dependent variable (at the gas station level) and measures
of market search as independent variables. Speciﬁcally, we proxy for the extent of search
by measuring the percentage of young drivers among each gas station’s customers: work
by Germany’s Bundeskartellamt indicates that young people are disproportionately more
likely to use a price-comparison app that greatly helps the process of ﬁnding low gasoline
prices. (Below we discuss the validity of this proxy for the extent of consumer search.)
We also consider a series of other controls, including in particular the degree of com-
petition in each station’s neighborhood, which we measure with the number of competing
stations. Since the number of competitors depends on price itself, the number of stations in
the greater environment of 3 to 12 miles (divided by population) is used as an instrument
for market potential.1
Our results are broadly consistent with the theoretical prediction of a U-shaped relation
between the degree of search and price. Considering the sample range of the variable “share
of young people,” we estimate (with statistical precision) a price range (highest estimated
average price minus lowest estimated average price) of about 2.5 cents of Euro per liter, a
value that, extrapolated to the German gasoline market, would correspond to e1.7 billion
per year.
Related literature. The eﬀect of search costs on the nature of oligopoly competition has
been a topic of research interest at least since Stigler (1964). From a formal, game-theoretic
standpoint, two important articles are Varian (1980) and Stahl (1989), who develop models
where consumers can be divided into searchers and non-searchers; Varian (1980) considers
the case when search is simultaneous, whereas Stahl (1989) assumes sequential search. Both
of these models imply that average price is decreasing in the fraction of searchers (that is,
consumer search increases the level of market competitiveness). Moreover, both models
imply price dispersion and that the variance of the price distribution is a non-monotonic
(inverted-U) function of the degree of searchers: price dispersion is minimal when the
fraction of searchers is 0 or 100%.
When it comes to collusion, the literature on the eﬀects of consumer search is surprisingly
scarce. (There is an extensive literature on transparency, but it refers to transparency
among sellers.) Building on the work of Nilsson (1999) and Schultz (2005), Petrikaite˙
(2016) develops a sequential-search model in the tradition of Stahl (1989) and shows that
the critical discount factor above which collusion is sustainable is a non-monotonic function
of the share of shoppers: ﬁrst decreasing and then increasing.2 This results from the diﬀerent
rates at which deviation proﬁts and punishment proﬁts vary as a function of the measure
of searchers. To the extent that more favorable collusion stability conditions are associated
with higher prices, Petrikaite˙’s (2016) result suggests an inverted U-shaped relation between
the measure of searchers and equilibrium price (in homogenous-product markets): collusion
is most likely (and prices highest) when the measure of searchers is neither too low nor too
high.
Diﬀerently from Petrikaite˙ (2016), our theoretical model assumes simultaneous search, in
1. See Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), Nevo (2001), Schaumans and Verboven (2015) for similar
approaches.
2. This result is derived analytically for the two-seller case and numerically for higher values of n.
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the tradition of Varian (1980), an approach we believe is more appropriate for the empirical
case we consider. More important, rather than stressing the stability of collusion we focus
on the participation constraint (is collusion worthwhile?). This results in a prediction
regarding the relation between the fraction of searchers and average price which is the
opposite of Petrikaite˙’s (2016). Our paper also includes an empirical test which vindicates
our theoretical prediction.
From an empirical point of view, Pennerstorfer et al. (2015) and Chandra and Tappata
(2011) are closest to our paper.3 They ﬁnd evidence of an inverted-U relationship between
the measure of searchers and the degree of price dispersion, as well as a monotonically
decreasing relationship between the measure of searchers and average price. Both of these
results are consistent with Varian (1980) and Stahl (1989). Our results diﬀer in that, for high
values of the measure of searchers, average price is increasing in the measure of searchers.
At a theoretical level, this result is consistent with a framework where we add the possibility
of collusion to Varian’s (1980) static model; at an empirical level, we identify with statistical
precision an eﬀect of signiﬁcant economic impact (2.5 cents of Euro per liter).
A recent empirical paper which is close to our is Luco (2018), who considers the Chilean
gasoline market. He makes use of the sequential implementation of an online price-disclosure
policy to perform a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences analysis. The question he addresses is diﬀerent
from the question we address in our theoretical model and empirical analysis. That said,
there is a relation between the result of the two papers, an issue to which we return in
Section 4.
Road map. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we lay down our
theoretical model. First, we present the static game, which follows Varian (1980). Second,
we consider the possibility of collusion with the assumption that ﬁrms collude if and only
if the gains from collusion exceed collusion costs. Section 2 includes our main theoretical
result (average price is a U-shaped function of the measure of searchers) and concludes with
a preliminary regression on pseudo-data generated by the theoretical model.
Section 3 presents the data we use for empirical analysis, in particular our choices of
variables to measure price and the extent of search. Section 4 presents the results of our
basic regressions of price on the extent of search while subsequent Section 5 contains a
series of robustness checks. In Section 6 we present additional evidence regarding our
main narrative, namely that the incentives to engage in collusive practices is related to the
propensity of consumers to search. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. Theoretical analysis
This section lays out the theoretical framework which we then use in Section 4 to test
speciﬁc predictions. We ﬁrst develop our basic model of demand and competition in retail.
We then consider two possible games (and equilibria) resulting from the basic model: the
equilibrium of the static game and the collusive equilibrium of an inﬁnitely-repeated version
3. Pennerstorfer et al. (2015) also cite a series of studies on the relation between the measure of
searchers and price dispersion based on Internet search data: Brown and Goolsbee (2002), Tang
et al. (2010), Sengupta and Wiggins (2014). Following Ellison and Ellison (2005) and Ellison and
Ellison (2009), they question the validity of online data for a “clean” analysis of the relation
between the measure of search and market outcomes.
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of the static game.
Model. Consider a market with n ﬁrms and a measure 1 of consumers. Each consumer
has a valuation r (reservation level) for at most one unit supplied by one of the ﬁrms.
We assume that each consumer is initially “attached” to a ﬁrm, each ﬁrm with equal
probability. Following Varian (1980), a fraction φ of these consumers are searchers, meaning
they purchase from the lowest-price seller independently of the ﬁrm they are attached to.4
The other consumers, a fraction 1−φ, are loyal consumers, which means they only purchase
from the ﬁrm they are attached to, if at all.
Static and collusive equilibria. The static equilibrium of this game corresponds to
Varian (1980). Firms mix between r and lower values of p, all the way down to p. Each
ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between any of these prices: a higher price implies a higher margin but
also a lower probability of attracting any searchers (who purchase from the ﬁrm setting the
lowest price). Given each ﬁrm’s indiﬀerence, equilibrium proﬁts are easy to determine: each
ﬁrm is as well as setting p = r, which leads to proﬁts
π̂ = (1− φ) r/n (1)
where the hat over π denotes static Nash equilibrium.
Consider now the inﬁnite repetition of the static game, assuming that each player dis-
counts the future according the discount factor δ. It is well known that, if δ is close enough
to 1, then there exists a collusive equilibrium such that ﬁrms set p = r in each period.
In fact, there exist many such equilibria. A particularly simple one corresponds to grim
strategies: each ﬁrm sets p = r if, in the past, all ﬁrms set p = r; and all ﬁrms revert to
playing the static Nash equilibrium forever if ever any ﬁrm deviates from p = r. Since all
ﬁrms set the same price, all consumers purchase from the seller they are assigned to. It
follows that ﬁrm proﬁt is given by
π∗ = r/n (2)
regardless of ﬁrm type. Note that, as expected, π∗ > π̂i.
The determinants of collusion. Grout and Sonderegger (2005) aptly summarize the
theoretical literature on collusion by stating that it is “primarily concerned with the com-
pliance of independent ﬁrms with agreements that reduce competition within a market.”
Speciﬁcally, much of the extant theoretical work is based on the repeated-game framework;
and typically assumes ﬁrms play grim-strategies (set monopoly prices and, if a ﬁrm deviates
from the prescribed equilibrium, revert to the static equilibrium forever).
A common result in this literature is that, if the discount factor is greater than some
critical threshold δ′, then grim-strategy collusion is feasible (see, e.g., Friedman, 1971).
The literature then goes about deriving comparative statics results with respect to various
exogenous parameters: that is, studying how each of these exogenous parameters aﬀects
the critical value δ′. As Harrington (2015) put it, “the focus of economic theory has been
on characterizing the market conditions conducive to satisfying the stability condition.” In
the context of search and collusion, a particularly important reference is Petrikaite˙ (2016).
4. If more than one ﬁrm sets the same lowest price, we assume consumers are equally likely to choose
any of these; unless one of the ﬁrms is the “home” ﬁrm, in which case the consumer chooses the
home ﬁrm. This assumption is not critical for our results but simpliﬁes the analysis.
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While obviously there is value in this approach, we believe it misses an important issue:
by stressing whether collusion is feasible, it largely ignores the issue of whether collusion is
proﬁtable. To quote Harrington (2015),
When there exists a stable collusive arrangement, when is it that ﬁrms want to
replace competition with collusion? That is, when collusion is feasible, when is
it desirable?
Accordingly, we follow a route diﬀerent from most of the previous literature. We assume
that the discount factor δ is suﬃciently high so that colluding by setting p = r is part of
a repeated-game Nash equilibrium.5 We then go back to Becker’s (1968) classic approach
and ask the question: when does crime (in this case collusion) pay?6
In answering this question, we make an important assumption: each period that ﬁrms
collude, they must pay a collusion cost c. The idea is that, by engaging in tacit or explicit
collusion, ﬁrms create a liability for themselves: the possibility that an investigation be
initiated that might lead to a conviction or, at the very least, a compliance cost with
competition authorities, as well a cost in terms of public relations.
As a ﬁrst step in our analysis we make a series of simplifying assumptions. First, that
collusion is a binary state: either ﬁrms collude or they do not. Second, the cost of collusion,
c, is the same for all ﬁrms and known with certainty. Third, the cost of collusion is invariant
with respect to price. These simplifying assumptions regarding collusion allow us to focus
on the central focus of the paper: the relation between the propensity to search, collusion,
and equilibrium prices. Later in this section we consider various extensions.
The question we address is whether collusion is worthwhile once the collusion cost is
taken into consideration. In the simpliﬁed version of the model we consider, the answer is
quite straightforward: collusion pays if and only if
π∗ − c > π̂ (3)
which is equivalent to
φ ≥ φ′ ≡ n c
r
(4)
Comparative statics. Equation (3) corresponds to the core of our analysis: the cost-
beneﬁt analysis of collusion. Whereas most of the prior literature focuses on the stability of
collusion, we ask the question of when ﬁrms prefer collusion to the alternative of static Nash
competition. Similar to the prior theoretical literature on collusion, we ask how exogenous
parameters impinge on whether (3) is or is not satisﬁed. This brings us to our central result:
Proposition 1. For low values of φ (resp. high values of φ), the price distribution is de-
creasing (resp. increasing) in φ in the sense of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance. The same
is true for the minimum value of the support of the price distribution.
5. This is consistent with Harrington’s (2015) claim that “many industries which could sustain a
collusive arrangement, do not; and there are many instances of cartels which could have eﬀectively
operated prior to when the cartel was formed but did not.” This suggests that δ > δ′ is not the
binding constraint.
6. See also Landes (1983).
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Proof: Consider ﬁrst the static equilibrium (no collusion). By setting monopoly price a
seller expects to sell only to loyal consumers, that is, the non-searching consumers who are
attached to the seller. This leads to a proﬁt of
(1− φ) r/n
By selling at a lower price, a seller expects to sell to non-searchers plus to all searchers if
its price p is lower than the prices set by all other sellers. This corresponds to an expected
proﬁt of
p
(
1− φ
n
+ φ
(
1− F (p))n−1)
Mixing implies indiﬀerence between any p in the interval [p, r], that is, implies the equality
of the above two proﬁt expressions:
p
(
1− φ
n
+ φ
(
1− F (p))n−1) = 1− φ
n
r (5)
for all p ∈ [p, r], where F (p) is the seller’s price mixed strategy. Solving for F (p), we get
F (p) = 1− n−1
√
(1− φ) (r − p)
φn p
(6)
The derivative of the root argument with respect to φ is given by −(r − p)/n/p/φ2, which
is negative. It follows that the F (p) is increasing in φ, which implies the distribution of p
is decreasing in φ in the sense of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance.
From (4), the above pricing pattern prevails if and only if φ < φ′ ≡ n c/r. For φ > φ′,
ﬁrms prefer to engage in collusion and set p = r. Together with the previous analysis, we
conclude that: (a) If φ is suﬃciently low, then φ < n c/r and price is decreasing in φ in the
sense of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance. (b) If φ is suﬃciently high, then φ > n c/r and
p = r, which implies that price increases (weakly) in φ.
Solving (5) for F (p) = 0, we get
p =
(1− φ) r
1 + φ (n− 1) (7)
from which we get
d p
dφ
= − n r(
1 + φ (n− 1))2 < 0
and the result for p follows in the same manner as the ordering in term of ﬁrst-order stochas-
tic dominance.
In words, if the measure of searchers is small then the competitive solution (no collusion)
prevails, and price is decreasing as the measure of searchers increases. If however the
measure of searchers increases beyond the n c/r threshold, then prices increase to monopoly
price, whereas further increases in φ lead to price constant at r. Together, these results
generate the two branches of the U-shaped relation between φ and p.
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Proposition 1 illustrated. Suppose for simplicity that n = 2. From (6), we get
f(p) =
(1− φ) r
2φ p2
From (7) we conclude that p = (1 − φ)/(1 + φ) r. It follows that average price (under no
collusion) is given by
p =
∫ r
p
x
(1− φ) r
2φx2
dx =
(1− φ) r
2φ
ln
(
1 + φ
1− φ
)
(8)
If φ ≥ φ′, however, then collusion takes place and p = p = r.
Combining the two cases, we obtain the values of p as a function of φ. This is shown in
the left panel of Figure 1, which illustrates Proposition 1. Note that, for low values of φ,
average price is decreasing in φ. (Price is distributed in the shaded region.) However, as φ
increases from a value lower than φ′ to a value greater than φ′, then average price increases.
Together, these observations illustrate the U-shaped relation between the extent of search
and average price.
Partial collusion. So far we have assumed that collusion is a binary outcome which
implies a cost c. However, one might expect the cost of engaging in collusion to be an
increasing function of the collusion price level. For example, a higher price might lead
to closer scrutiny by of antitrust authorities, which in turn increases the likelihood of an
investigation and the expected cost from collusion.
Speciﬁcally, suppose that the cost from collusion is a function of the collusion price p,
that is, c = C(p). Then ﬁrms would choose to collude at a price level that maximizes
p/n − C(p). (Recall that we assume zero marginal cost and a measure one of consumers,
each buying one unit.) Let p∗ be the price that maximizes net proﬁts from collusion. Notice
that, since collusion proﬁts are independent of the measure of searchers, the value of p∗ is
itself independent of φ.
The decision of whether to collude is now determined by the inequality
p∗/n− c > π̂ = (1− φ) r/n
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which is equivalent to
φ ≥ φ′′ ≡ n c+ r − p
∗
r
If p∗ = r, then we are back to the previous result. More generally, if p∗ < r, then we obtain
a higher value of the critical φ. This is intuitive: if the expected beneﬁt from collusion
is lower, then it takes a higher value of the measure of searchers to justify the switch to
collusion.
In sum, despite the change in the precise threshold separating the competitive and the
collusive outcome, as well as the price set in case of collusion, the nature of the result
remains the same as before.
Randomly distributed collusion cost. The discontinuity implied by the switch from
no-collusion to collusion leads to a relation between p and φ which is non-monotonic but
not very similar to a U. Partly, this results from our stark assumption of a ﬁxed value of c,
which in turn leads to collusion with probability 0 or 100%. Suppose however that the value
of c is randomly distributed. For example, suppose that c is uniformly distributed between 0
and c . Collusion proﬁt is given by π∗ = 12 r, whereas static Nash equilibrium proﬁt is given
by 12 (1−φ) r. It follows that collusion takes place iﬀ and only if c ≤ 12 r− 12 (1−φ) r = 12 φ r,
which happens with probability 12 φ r/c . By contrast, with probability 1− 12 φ r/c average
price is given by r/(1 + φ) (as before). Overall, average price is now given by
E(p) = 12 φ
r
c
r +
(
1− 12 φ
r
c
) (1− φ) r
2φ
ln
(
1 + φ
1− φ
)
(We distinguish p, equilibrium price under the Varian (1980) equilibrium, from E(p), the
overall equilibrium price which includes the possibility of collusion.) The right-hand panel
of Figure 1 plots the value of (overall) average price as a function of φ for the case when
r = 1 and c = 12 . Now, the “forces” of competition and collusion work in a continuous way,
resulting in a U-shaped relation between the measure of searchers and average price. For
low values of φ, an increase in φ has a strong negative eﬀect on average price. Moreover,
the possible switch to collusion (which takes place in the unlikely event that collusion cost
is very small) does not have a big eﬀect on average price because average price itself is very
high. As φ continues to increase, the diﬀerence between static Nash proﬁt and collusion
proﬁt increases. As a result, the likelihood that collusion cost is lower than the gain from
collusion increases. Moreover, the gap between static equilibrium price and collusion price
is greater, which implies that the switch from no collusion to collusion has a greater impact
on price. This in turn explains why the slope of the relation between φ and p becomes
positive.
Endogenous search. The model considered so far assumes that consumers’ search cost
is either zero or inﬁnity, so they either always search or never search. In a sense, we take
buyer search as an exogenous phenomenon: to the extent that some buyers have zero search
cost and others inﬁnite search cost, the choice of whether or not to search is trivial.
A more general case assumes that consumer search cost is distributed according to the
continuously diﬀerentiable cdf G(s). Suppose also that, in the eyes of consumers, the value
of c, the sellers’ collusion cost, is distributed according to the continuously diﬀerentiable
cdf H(c).
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Speciﬁcally, suppose that the distributions of c and s are common knowledge; that
sellers and buyers simultaneously choose their collusion/pricing and search strategies; and,
as before, that if no collusion takes place then pricing follows the Varian (1980) model.
In this extended model, an equilibrium is deﬁned by a critical value of collusion cost, c∗,
below which sellers collude; a critical value of search cost, s∗, below which buyers search; a
price distribution conditional on collusion not taking place; and the conditions that sellers’
collusion and pricing strategies, as well as buyers’ search strategy, are optimal given the
other agents’ choices.
For simplicity, we continue to consider the case when n = 2. From (4), we conclude that
collusion is a best response if and only if
c ≤ 12 φ r
Absent collusion, sellers play a Varian (1980) game and the price distribution is charac-
terized by the cdf given in (6), where we note that φ, the measure of searchers, is now an
endogenous variable. By contrast, if sellers collude then price is equal to r.
Under collusion, the gains from search are zero (all ﬁrms set the same price). Under
Varian pricing, expected gain from search, v, equals the diﬀerence between expected price
(what a buyer expects to pay from visiting a random store) and expected minimum price
q = mini pi (what a buyer expects to pay from observing all prices):
v =
(
1−H(c∗)) (E(p)− E(q))
where q corresponds to the ﬁrst order statistic of (p1, p2). If n = 2, E(p) is given by (8). As
to q, its cdf is given by K(q), which, for n = 2, is given by
K(q) = 1−(1− F (q))2 = 1−((1− φ) (r − q)
2φ q
)2
It follows that the corresponding density is given by
k(q) =
(1− φ)2 (r − q) r
2φ2 q3
Therefore
E(q) =
∫ r
p
p
(1− φ)2 (r − x) r
2φ2 x3
dx =
(1− φ) r
φ
+
(1− φ)2 r
2φ2
ln
(
1− φ
1 + φ
)
(9)
Together, (8) and (9) imply that the value from search is given by
E(p)− E(q) = (1− φ) r
2φ
(
1
φ
ln
(
1 + φ
1− φ
)
− 2
)
A ﬁrst equilibrium condition is that, for the indiﬀerent searcher, search cost is equal to
expected gain from search: s∗ = v, which implies
s∗ =
(
1−H(c∗)) (E(p)− E(q)) (10)
A second equilibrium condition is that, for the indiﬀerent colluding ﬁrms, the cost from
collusion is equal to the expected gain from collusion. This implies
c∗ = 12 G(s
∗) r (11)
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For simplicity, we continue to use φ to denote the measure of searchers, although we now
explicitly take into account that φ is endogenously determined, speciﬁcally,
φ = G(s∗) (12)
Putting (10)–(12) together, we get the following equation in φ
G−1(φ) =
(
1−H
(
1
2 φ r
)) (1− φ) r
2φ
(
1
φ
ln
(
1 + φ
1− φ
)
− 2
)
(13)
Given an equilibrium value of φ, s∗ and c∗ are uniquely determined by (10) and (11).
Equation (13) cannot be solved in closed form. Numerical computations show that it
admits a unique interior solution. As an illustration, consider the case when c and s are
uniformly distributed: H(c) = γ c and G(s) = ς s (that is, γ = 1/c and ς = 1/s). Without
loss of generality, assume r = 1.
Figure 2 displays the main equilibrium values as a function of ς, a measure of the
propensity to search. The top left panel depicts the equilibrium measure of searchers. For
a distribution of high search costs (low ς), we get a corner solution where no buyers search
and sellers price at r, whereby there are no gains from search.7 As the distribution of
search costs becomes more favorable (higher ς, that is, lower search costs), a unique interior
solution is obtained, with a cutoﬀ value s∗ that falls strictly between 0 (minimum search
cost) and 1/ς (maximum search cost).
7. This situation is reminiscent of the equilibrium of Diamond’s (1971) model.
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The top right panel shows average price conditional on no collusion taking place. The
greater the value of ς, the greater the measure of searchers and the lower the price distri-
bution (in the sense of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance).
A lower price distribution is also associated with lower equilibrium proﬁts. As the
bottom left panel shows, this corresponds to a probability of collusion, H(c∗), which is
increasing in ς (except for very low values of ς, when the measure of searchers is zero and
so is the probability of collusion).
Finally, the bottom right panel shows the overall equilibrium price taking into account
both endogenous search and endogenous collusion. For very low values of ς (high search
costs) we get the corner solution with no search and price at the monopoly level. As ς
increases and the measure of searchers increases, the ﬁrst eﬀect on price is that the Varian
(1980) equilibrium price decreases, causing a decline in average price. However, as ς further
increases, the eﬀect of increased probability of collusion eventually dominates (notice how
average price as a function of ς is a convex function, implying that the static competitive
eﬀect of an increase in ς becomes marginally lower). As a result, equilibrium price eventually
becomes an increasing function of ς.
Figure 2 also suggests that a good proxy for ς is also a good proxy for φ. We will use
this idea next, when we consider testable empirical implications.
Testable predictions. The property that the price distribution is decreasing (or in-
creasing) in ς (in the sense of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance) implies a series of testable
predictions for gas-station-level regressions. For low levels of ς, (a) price is decreasing (in
the sense of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance) in ς; (b) the lowest value of the price distri-
bution is decreasing in ς; and (c) the mean value of the price distribution is decreasing in
ς. For high values of ς, the opposite is true.
Regarding price dispersion, our model has the same implication as static models in the
Varian (1980) and Stahl (1989) tradition, namely, the relation between price dispersion
and the propensity to search follows an inverse-U pattern: for low values of ς, an increase
in ς leads to an increase in dispersion; and for high values of ς the opposite is true. An
alternative second moment of the price distribution is price range. Unlike price dispersion,
the prediction is that an increase in ς leads to an increase in price range for all values of
ς. The idea is that price range under the Varian (1980) is increasing in φ; and as long as
the probability of collusion is not equal to 1, the price range in the static equilibrium is the
dominant eﬀect.
Finally, to the extent that we can ﬁnd direct evidence of tacit collusion, an additional
testable implication is that the probability of collusion is increasing in ς.
3. Data
Our empirical tests consist of regressing measures of seller pricing behavior on measures of
consumer search behavior. We divide our data description accordingly.
Prices. Since 2013, the German Cartel Oﬃce (Bundeskartellamt) — speciﬁcally, its
Market Transparency Unit for Fuels — has been collecting detailed retail fuel prices in an
eﬀort to improve its ability to oppose illegal market practices. Companies which operate
gas stations are obliged to report price changes for the most commonly used types of fuel
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— Super E5, Super E10 and Diesel — in real time.
We obtained from the Market Transparency Unit for Fuels data on real-time prices at
the pump in a variety of German cities during the month of May 2015. So as to work
with a manageable-sized dataset, we use 15-minute time intervals. Moreover, given limited
availability of easily-accessible (but crucial) RHS-variable data, we focus our analysis on
the city of Dortmund, a city with close to 600,000 inhabitants and 86 gas stations (as of
May 2015). Finally, we measure prices at the pump net of taxes.
We complement station-level price data with additional station-level information. Specif-
ically, we proxy for the fraction of searchers among each station’s customers by measuring
the share of young inhabitants (ages 18 to 29) in each of the local areas Dortmund is divided
into.8 Since this corresponds to an important part of our empirical strategy, later in this
section we take a closer look at its validity.
Regarding a station’s local market competition, we consider two variables. First, the
fraction of neighboring stations that are not branded. To the extent that no-brand stations
are more competitive, this variable measures one dimension of market competitiveness.
According to a German Cartel Oﬃce 2011 investigation, the branded stations belong to one
of the following four networks: Aral, Esso, Shell and Total. They represent 50.49% of all
gas stations in our dataset.
Additionally, we measure the number of competitors as a proxy for the intensity of com-
petition, which should have a substantial inﬂuence on price levels. Speciﬁcally, we consider
the number of competitors within a 1.25-mile radius. Since the number of competitors
depends on price itself, the number of stations in the greater environment of 3 to 12 miles
(divided by population) is used as an instrument for market potential.9
We consider additional local-market variables, for instance the number of cars, household
income and population density. Except for the number of cars, these variables do not seem
to have any signiﬁcant correlation with prices and are thus excluded from our analysis.
Figure 3 shows various features of the data. From the top left panel we see that there is a
clear daily price-setting pattern, with higher prices at night gradually declining throughout
the day and reaching lower levels during rush hour. The top right panel shows the kernel
density of prices at 5pm, with branded and non-branded gas stations classiﬁed separately.
Two striking features of this ﬁgure is the considerable variability in prices, which is consis-
tent with the theoretical model; and the signiﬁcant diﬀerence between prices by branded
and non-branded stations. This latter diﬀerence justiﬁes the diﬀerent treatment of branded
and non-branded stations, as well as the use of the fraction of non-branded stations as a
measure of local market competitiveness. The bottom panels show the traﬃc and Google
search patterns by time of day. As can be seen, the 5–6pm period is the period of highest
traﬃc and the period of most intense search (as measured by Google searches). Considering
the problem we are interested in analyzing (the eﬀect of search on market competition),
we focus our analysis during rush-hour period, that is, the ﬁve 15-minute slots beginning
at 5pm. Further analysis suggests that the qualitative results are robust to changes in the
8. Note that we distinguish between local markets (deﬁned as the market faced by each gas station)
and local areas (deﬁned as the areas of the municipality of Dortmund for which average age is
available).
9. See Bresnahan and Reiss, 1991;Nevo, 2001; Schaumans and Verboven, 2015. Population and
population density are more frequently used as instruments. Our preference for the number of
competitors is justiﬁed by the similarity of building restrictions in neighboring areas, thus allowing
us to capture correlations not present by population-based variables.
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Figure 3
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time frame considered.
Search. We are unable to observe consumer search directly. Instead, we create an
indirect measure of the extent of consumer search. The Market Transparency Unit for Fuels
— which we referred to at the beginning of the section — does not oﬀer price information
directly to the public. However, a variety of private consumer information service providers
have access to it and consumers in turn can search prices by accessing these services.
Via the internet, a smartphone or navigation system, motorists will be able to
gain information on the current fuel prices and ﬁnd the cheapest petrol station
in their vicinity or along a speciﬁc route. This will allow for a better overview
of prices and an informed choice which will increase competition.10
(Note that, in this setting, our assumption regarding search — searchers obtain information
on all prices at once, rather than sequentially — seems justiﬁed.) By the Transparency
Unit’s own account,
The gasoline price app is very popular with consumers: 24 percent of German
car drivers have already used the oﬀer since its introduction in September and
have compared gas prices over the Internet or smartphone apps; another 61
percent have heard of the possibility but did not use it yet. The response to
the gasoline price app is particularly high for men and for younger age groups.
10. See http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/, visited July 2017.
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With regard to gender, 30 percent of men and 18 percent of women have already
compared prices. With regard to age, 39 per cent of the drivers in the 18–29
age bracket have used the app, as opposed to only 14 percent of the 60+ age
bracket.11
Consistently with this evidence, we propose as a proxy for the propensity to search a variable
reﬂecting the fraction of population in the 18–29 age bracket (“share of young”, or simply
SOY ) among each station’s customer base.
Speciﬁcally, we construct our station-level SOY variable following a gravity-equation
approach.12 We determine the distance from each of the 86 stations to the GPS center
of each of the 62 administrative areas of Dortmund (for which we have SOY data).13 We
then compute each station’s SOY value as a weighted average of all 62 values, with weights
calculated according to the population in the administrative area divided by the square of
the Euclidian distance from the respective station to each of the area centers.14
One would expect each driver’s consideration set to include stations near home, near the
workplace, or along the daily commute. Our restriction to the area of residence is clearly
a restriction to a subset of the real consideration set. However, to the extent that there is
a positive correlation between a driver’s home location and the probability that local gas
stations belong to their consideration set, SOY works as a proxy (though possibly a noisy
proxy). Moreover, we considered a number of alternative deﬁnitions of the age-by-location
variable (the results of which are included in the robustness checks section) and found that
the results are remarkably stable.
Moreover, we also considered alternative deﬁnitions of station-level SOY that take into
account commuting patterns. Speciﬁcally, we use data on commuting patterns provided
by the North Rhine-Westphalia Statistical Oﬃce to create SOY weights that take into
account inner city commuters driving from other city districts as well as from outside of the
city.15 We perform a number of robustness checks by changing the relative weight given to
commuters, as shown at the end of this section.
Notwithstanding the multiple robustness checks we preform, our empirical analysis
hinges on our measure of the propensity to search, that is, the use of the SOY variable. One
way to test the validity of our proxy is to test whether the use of the app (or apps) that
provide information about prices is related to SOY . We obtained data on the number of
search queries directed to one of the app providers in Germany, Tank-Navigator (by Mam-
muth Applications).16 Table 1 displays the results of simple OLS regression of app use on
an age dummy. The unit of observation is a municipality in Germany (N = 512).17 The
dependent variable is total number of app queries per municipality per capita by municipal-
11. Our translation from the German.
12. See Allain et al. (2017) for a similar construction in a study of the French supermarket sector.
13. See Dortmunder Stadtatlas 2015, https://www.dortmund.de/ media/p/statistik 3/
statistik/veroeﬀentlichungen/jahresberichte/Statistikatlas 2015.pdf. The 586,181 inhabitants of
Dortmund then break down to an average of 9,455 inhabitants per area.
14. Estimating regression models with unweighted SOY does change the coeﬃcients quantitatively.
15. See https://www.it.nrw.de/statistik/b/daten/eckdaten/r543Pendler.html,
https://www.lwl.org/LWL/Kultur/Westfalen Regional/Verkehr/Berufspendler 2011, last visited
October 2017. See also Spiekermann and Wegener (1995).
16. See https://www.tank-navigator.de/. Mammuth Applications is ranked among the bigger price
comparison website providers: it belongs to the 100–500k app downloads category.
17. Age distribution is obtained from http://www.inkar.de/.
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Table 1
App downloads and age distribution
Dependent variable: App use
Age 18 to 30 .6064***
(.1110)
Age 18 to 50 .5209***
(.0991)
Age 50 to 65 -.8216***
(.1925)
Constant -4.3977***
(1.3601)
-16.7038***
(3.7347)
22.3748***
(4.4778)
R2 .0912 .1218 .1003
N 512 512 512
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Star levels: 10, 5 and 1%.
Table 2
Descriptive statistics
Variable # obs Mean St.Dev. Min Max
Price (net, Euro) 180,855 0.57 0.06 0.50 0.80
Share of young (age 18-29) 180,855 0.14 0.01 0.11 0.16
Share of young (age 18-65) 180,855 0.64 0.02 0.61 0.66
Number of competitors 180,855 6 3 1 16
Share of branded stations 180,855 0.50 0.30 0 1
Branded station 180,855 0.50 0.50 0 1
Cars per 109 people 180,855 0.50 0.06 0.36 0.65
Stations / population 180,855 0.014 0.0059 0.0051 0.0311
ity; the independent variable is the percentage of municipality population of age 18–30 (ﬁrst
equation) or age 18–50 (second equation). The results clearly indicate that the presence of
younger age groups has a strong, positive impact on the frequency of search queries.
Summary statistics. Table 2 presents summary statistics of the data we use for our
regressions. Notice in particular that the variable “Share of young,” which plays a central
role in our analysis of the relation between search and price, varies from 11% and 16%, with
a standard deviation of 1%. Although the support of the SOY variable is relatively small
with an interval between minimum and maximum values measuring only about 6%, this
is in line with other research investigating the impact of search on market outcomes. We
therefore believe this to be suﬃcient to inﬂuence retailers’ behavior and market outcome.18
18. See Brown (2018) for a recent study of search on markups in the health care sector.
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We return to this issue at the end of Section 6.
4. Results
Proposition 1 implies a U-shaped relation between a variety of price measures (price level,
average price, minimum price) and the propensity to consumer search. As a proxy for the
latter, we estimate each station’s fraction of young consumers (SOY ) among its customer
base. Therefore, a natural way of testing Proposition 1 is to regress measures of prices on
a quadratic polynomial of SOY ; that is, to use SOY and SOY 2 as explanatory variables.
Proposition 1 predicts a negative coeﬃcient on the linear term and a positive coeﬃcient on
the squared term.
Our observations are at the gas station level. As mentioned earlier, we consider rush-
hour 15 minute time intervals in Dortmund, a total of 12,398 observations. Our basic
regression model takes the form
pit = β0 + β1 SOY i + β2 SOY
2
i + β3 N̂OC i + β4 SBR i + β5 BRA i + β6 CAR i +
T∑
τ=1
βτ I τ,t + it
where i indexes the station, t the time period, It denotes day ﬁxed eﬀects (controlling for,
e.g., aggregate input price or demand shocks),  is an error term, βk (k = 0, ..., T + 6) the
regression parameters, and the independent variables are deﬁned as follows:19
• p: price measure
• SOY : estimate of share of 18–29 year old population shopping at station i
• NOC : number of gas stations in station i’s neighborhood (1.25-mile-radius circle)
• SBR : share of branded gas stations in station i’s neighborhood
• BRA : dummy variable equal to 1 iﬀ station i is branded (Aral, Esso, Shell or Total)
• CAR : number of cars per inhabitant in station i’s neighborhood
Competitive intensity in a local market (here measured by NOC ) typically has an eﬀect on
price level. However, the number of competitors is determined endogenously by entry deci-
sions, which in turn are based on local market price. To circumvent potential endogeneity
issues, we instrument for the number of local market participants by measuring the number
of stations in the greater environment around station i. Speciﬁcally, we regress p on N̂OC ,
the predicted value from the regression
NOC i = α0 + α1 SGE i + α2 X i + νi
where SGE i is the number of competitors in the wider area around station i, that is,
the “donut” centered on station i (a 12-mile-radius circle that excludes the 3-mile-radius
19. We cluster standard errors at the station level or use the White correction for standard errors. The
results only diﬀer marginally; we report the results obtained by the White correction.
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Table 3
Parametric regression of price equations
Dependent variable: Price Mean Price Min Price
Share of young consumers -5.9284**
(2.9651)
-6.8834***
(2.0216)
-8.0028***
(2.2951)
Share of young consumers squared 23.0416**
(11.125)
26.5829***
(7.5637)
29.9891***
(8.4662)
Number of Competitors -0.0016***
(0.0006)
-0.0016***
(0.0004)
-0.0016***
(0.0005)
Share of branded stations 0.0044
(0.0069)
0.0216***
(0.0053)
0.0363***
(0.0077)
Branded station 0.0157***
(0.0025)
0.0000
(0.0016)
-0.0031
(0.0024)
Cars per 109 people 0.0601
(0.0378)
0.0535**
(0.022)
0.0151
(0.0177)
Constant 0.8900***
(0.1883)
0.9570***
(0.1308)
1.0493***
(0.1539)
Number of observations 12,398 12,398 12,398
R2 0.34 0.44 0.41
inner circle, both centered on station i’s location); and Xi includes the usual second-stage
variables used for the IV regression. 20
Regarding the regressions’s dependent variable, we consider three diﬀerent price mea-
sures:
• Price level. Station i’s price.
• Mean price. Average of all price set by stations in the neighborhood of station i, that
is, within a 1.25 mile radius circle.
• Min price. Minimum price among all stations in station i’s neighborhood, that is,
within a 1.25 mile radius circle.
The results of our regressions are shown in Table 3. From a theoretical point of view, the
coeﬃcients of interest are the coeﬃcients associated with the squared variables.21 As the
table shows, the coeﬃcients on SOY 2 are all positive, as predicted by Proposition 1, and
statistically signiﬁcant (at the 5% signiﬁcance level for price, at the 1% level for mean and
min price).
20. See Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), Nevo (2001), Schaumans and Verboven (2015) for similar
approaches to instrumenting for competition variables. Population and population density are more
frequently used as instruments. Our preference for the number of competitors is justiﬁed by the
similarity of building restrictions in neighboring areas, thus allowing us to capture correlations not
present by population-based variables. That said, we add that using population variables does not
change our results signiﬁcantly.
21. It is clear that the coeﬃcient of the linear variable has to be statistically signiﬁcantly negative not
to describe a progressively increasing or degressively decreasing function instead of a U-shape.
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In order to get an idea of the economic signiﬁcance of these estimates, Figure 4 plots
estimated price (in cents of Euro per liter) as a function of each station’s share of 18-29
year olds. Although SOY only varies from 9 to 16% (cf Table 2), SOY ’s range implies a
price variation of 2.5 cents, that is, about 5% of price. In a market with very low margins,
we believe this is a signiﬁcant range.
Figure 4 also allows us to restate our main theoretical point, this time with actual
industry estimates: Gas stations in areas with very few searchers (low values of SOY )
have relatively high market power (regardless of whether they are branded or not branded).
For this reason, sellers ﬁnd it optimal not to collude: the beneﬁts from collusion do not
compensate the potential costs. In this context, an increase in SOY , which proxies for an
increase in the fraction of searchers, leads to a more competitive market. Given that ﬁrms
do not collude, this corresponds to a lower price, as shown by the decreasing portion of the
graph in Figure 4.
As SOY continues increasing, and price decreasing, seller proﬁts become so low that it
pays to collude: the cost is the same, but the beneﬁt — the diﬀerence between collusion
and competition proﬁts — increases. As a result, an increase in SOY leads to an increase
in price, due to the switch from competitive to collusive pricing.
As mentioned in Section 1, a recent paper by Luco (2018) looks at the eﬀects making
price information available in the Chilean gasoline market. He concludes that price dis-
closure leads to an increase in prices, and that the price increase is greater in areas where
search costs are lowest. Our research question is diﬀerent from Luco’s (2018). However, we
can use our results to perform the conceptual experiment of comparing the observed price
levels to the price levels that would persist if price information were not available (and thus
app-based search were impossible). Our model would predict that all prices would be at
the reservation level (as there would be no search). Given that, the eﬀect of introducing
search is to decrease prices in areas with moderate levels of search but not in areas with
high levels of search. This diﬀers from Luco (2018) in two diﬀerent ways. First, he observes
an increase in prices, whereas we would predict a decrease in prices. This is because we
assume that, other than the cost of engaging in collusion, sellers have no informational
diﬃculty in engaging in collusion. Second, Luco (2018) observe no non-monotonicity in the
eﬀect of search costs. In terms of our theoretical model, his results are consistent with the
left branch of our U-shaped relation between search and prices.
5. Robustness checks
We performed a number of robustness checks, the results of which can be found in Table
4. In all regressions the dependent variable is gas station price. For reference, column (1)
reproduces the results from the price equation in Table 3.
Market deﬁnition. We considered diﬀerent radii in our deﬁnition of a local market as
well as the neighboring market: 2 miles instead of 1.25 miles for the inner circle and 15
miles instead of 12 miles for the outer circle. Column (2) in Table 4 displays the results
of this alternative regression. As can be seen, the core coeﬃcients estimates remain very
similar in size and statistical signiﬁcance.
Share of young consumers. We considered diﬀerent deﬁnitions of the SOY variable.
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First, we also include each station’s neighboring districts. The idea is that, since most
drivers are commuters, they may ﬁll up at a pump close to the workplace rather than the
district of residence. Column (3) in Table 4 shows that, again, the value and the precision
of the core coeﬃcients remains virtually unchanged.
A diﬀerent variation in the SOY variable consists in changing the age range. Column
(4) corresponds to measuring SOY as the share of inhabitants with ages 18 to 65 (that is,
the combination of the 18–29 and 30–65 brackets). Naturally, the independent variable’s
mean value is greater under this alternative deﬁnition: from .14 to .64. In order to make the
models comparable, we compute the product of the estimated coeﬃcient and the mean value
of the dependent variable. Regarding SOY , we get 23.0416×.142−5.9284×.14+0.89 = .512
in the base model and 44.6679 × .642 − 56.4875 × .64 + 18.3492 = .493 in model (4). In
other words, the relevant coeﬃcient is remarkably similar.
Finally, column (5) combines the independent-variable changes in columns (3) and (4).
The coeﬃcient estimates change very marginally with respect to model (4), though their
statistical signiﬁcance is lower.
Diﬀerent functional forms. Although a quadratic functional form is a common approach
to estimate non-linear eﬀects, it is not the only one. As an alternative, we considered a
series of quantile regressions. Speciﬁcally, we divided our observations into an odd number
of bins according to the SOY variable and estimated dummy variable coeﬃcients for each
quantile, leaving the central quantile as the omitted variable.
Table 5 reports the results for terciles. As predicted by theory — and consistent with our
quadratic regression approach — the coeﬃcients for the ﬁrst and third tercile are positive
and statistically signiﬁcant.
Alternative dataset. A particularly important robustness test is to repeat the analysis
on a diﬀerent dataset. Although the price data is available for all of Germany, other variables
must be obtained on a municipality-by-municipality basis; and the way the data is organized
is not uniform. For this reason, extending the analysis to other German cities is not a trivial
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Table 4
Revised price equations with diﬀerent independent variable deﬁnitions:
(1) Base model (price regression from Table 3)
(2) Diﬀerent deﬁnitions of local market and neigbhorhood market
(3) SOY includes neighboring districts
(4) SOY includes ages 18–65
(5) Combination of (3) and (4)
Dependent variable: price: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Share of young consumers -5.9284**
(2.9651)
-5.0858*
(2.9678)
-6.8946**
(3.38)
-56.4875*
(32.5124)
-18.6928*
(10.0372)
Share of young consumers squared 23.0416**
(11.125)
19.8391*
(11.0509)
26.5247**
(12.6618)
44.6679*
(25.5706)
14.9195*
(7.8876)
Number of Competitors -0.0016***
(0.0006)
-0.0024*
(0.0013)
-0.0017***
(0.0006)
-0.0006
(0.0008)
-0.0014**
(0.0007)
Share of branded stations 0.0044
(0.0069)
0.0041
(0.007)
0.0045
(0.0069)
0.0054
(0.0067)
0.0034
(0.0065)
Branded station 0.0157***
(0.0025)
0.0139***
(0.0025)
0.0159***
(0.0025)
0.0167***
(0.0024)
0.0150***
(0.0025)
Cars per 109 people 0.0601
(0.0378)
0.0756*
(0.0427)
0.0545
(0.0371)
0.0661*
(0.034)
0.0573*
(0.0317)
Constant 0.8900***
(0.1883)
0.8237***
(0.1885)
0.9596***
(0.2171)
18.3492*
(10.3157)
6.3645**
(3.1844)
Number of observations 12,398 12,398 12,398 12,398 12,398
R2 0.34 0.31 0.34 0.37 0.36
20
Table 5
Regression results for terciles
Dependent variable: Price Mean Price Min Price
Tercile t1 0.0091*
(0.0052)
0.0088**
(0.0035)
0.0161***
(0.0047)
Tercile t3 0.0078**
(0.0035)
0.0078***
(0.0026)
0.0056**
(0.0023)
Number of Competitors -0.0022**
(0.0009)
-0.0020***
(0.0006)
-0.0016**
(0.0007)
Share of branded stations 0.0053
(0.0073)
0.0225***
(0.0059)
0.0391***
(0.0086)
Branded station 0.0161***
(0.003)
0
(0.0022)
-0.0034
(0.0027)
Cars per 109 people 0.0134
(0.0358)
0.0112
(0.0223)
-0.0203
(0.0195)
Constant 0.5411***
(0.0203)
0.5408***
(0.0154)
0.5351***
(0.0164)
Number of observations 12,398 12,398 12,398
R2 0.29 0.37 0.41
task. That said, we were able to obtain similar SOY data (though not directly comparable)
for Mannheim, Germany. The results of our regressions of price on the measure of searchers
show a similar U-shaped pattern.
Other robustness checks. Our base regressions include as a dependent variable prices a
15 minute intervals during rush hour. One possible additional robustness check is to restrict
our regressions to one single minute observation during rush hour. The results from these
regressions are essentially identical to those when we pool observations, both in terms of
coeﬃcient size and in terms of statistical signiﬁcance.
We also censored the support of the SOY variable as a ﬁnal sanity check. We cut oﬀ
10% of the SOY variable support at both the lower and upper tails of the distribution. The
U-shaped relationship between price measures and SOY remains stable.
6. Additional empirical evidence
In this section, we provide two additional sources of evidence, which, together with the
price regressions presented in Section 4, strengthen our case for a U-shaped relationship
between the propensity to search and price levels, as well as the theoretical basis for this
relationship.
Our argument for a U-shaped relationship is based on the composition of two eﬀects: (a)
increased competition when there is no collusion; and (b) increased likelihood of collusive
behavior. One way to provide additional evidence for our theory is therefore to test directly
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for each of the above components. First, we test whether the range of gas station prices
increases when the propensity to search increases. The idea is that the price range is
determined by the static equilibrium, where the upper bound is given by monopoly price
and the lower bound is decreasing in the measure of searchers. Second, we directly test
whether the propensity to collude is increasing in the propensity to search.
Both of these tests are consistent with our theoretical model, as we show below. Our
last step is to show that our theoretical model reasonably explains the magnitude of the
eﬀects we observed. Speciﬁcally, we argue that the variation in propensity to search, once
fed into our theoretical model, implies a reasonable variation in expected price as well as
the estimated measure of searchers.
Search and price range. Since the price range under no-collusion is wider than the
price range under collusion, as long as the event of no collusion takes place with positive
probability we expect the price range to be increasing in the measure of searchers. In other
words, as far as the price range is concerned, the eﬀect of an increase in the measure of
searchers corresponds to the eﬀect under no collusion. And, as it is well known from the
Varian (1980) model, such range increases in the measure of searchers.
We estimated an OLS regression of price range on SOY as well as on other independent
variables considered before. Consistent with theory, we obtain a positive and statistically
signiﬁcant SOY coeﬃcient: 0.4466. Considering the range of SOY , from 0.108 to 0.163 (a
range of .055), this corresponds to an increase in the price range of about 2.4 cents, which
is admittedly on the low end. In sum, our results regarding price range are consistent with
theory.
Search and propensity to collude. Subsequently to our sample period, an important
event took place in the German retail fuel market: the Shell network of gas stations intro-
duced a price-matching guarantee (PMG) scheme to its cardholders.
It has been argued (both theoretically and empirically) that PMGs can be used as
mechanisms to facilitate collusion. In fact, starting in June 2015 we observe a series of
attempts by gas stations to increase prices. Although there is no direct evidence of collusion
— that is, no “smoking gun” — there are various indications that ﬁrms attempted to
tacitly collude following Shell’s PMG oﬀer. In particular, whereas in our sample prices
were uniformly declining during the day, we now observe a pattern of midday price jumps.
Moreover, a large fraction of these price jumps (about 90%) amount to exactly 3 cents; and
a large fraction takes place at exactly 12:01 or 12:02 (given the way the data is collected,
it may be diﬃcult to distinguish these times from noon). In other words, the behavior
of gas stations following Shell’s PMG exhibits many of the features typical of focal-point
tacit-collusion equilibria.
In a diﬀerent paper (Cabral et al., 2018) we examine in greater detail the causes of these
midday price jump patterns. For the present purpose, we take advantage of the considerable
spatial variation in their prevalence to examine their correlation with search intensity.
Our theoretical model predicts that the greater the propensity to search, the greater the
propensity to collude. The idea is that more searchers imply ﬁercer market competition,
which in turn increases the appeal of tacit collusion. In order to test this prediction,
we deﬁne a dependent dummy variable (at the gas-station-level) that equals 1 if the seller
increases price at noon. When we run a probit regression on SOY and the other independent
22
Figure 5
Search propensity (ς) and equilibrium values
6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 9
0.83
0.84
0.85
0.86
0.87
0.88
ς
Expected price (r = 1) density of ς
1
2
6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 9
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
ς
Fraction of searchers density of ς
1
2
variables used in our base regressions, we obtain a positive and statistically signiﬁcant SOY
coeﬃcient estimate: 20.8768 (standard deviation 9.1595). In terms of economic signiﬁcance,
as we consider the range of variation in SOY (from 0.108 to 0.163), this translates into a
0.72 cent price increase. In sum, we ﬁnd evidence consistent with the positive eﬀect of the
measure of searchers on the likelihood of collusion.
Back to the theoretical model. Our empirical section tests a qualitative implication
of the theoretical model, namely that the relation between a proxy for the propensity to
search (namely SOY as a proxy for ς) is nonmonotonic: for low values of ς, expected price
is decreasing, whereas for high values of ς, expected price is increasing in ς.
From Table 2, we see that our proxy for the propensity of search, SOY , ranges from 0.108
to 0.163, with a relatively low standard deviation of 0.0132. Since our analysis relies heavily
on the spatial variation of this variable, it is reasonable to ask whether the distribution of
SOY , once fed into the theoretical model, is consistent (in terms of orders of magnitude)
with our empirical results.
Suppose that the propensity to search by a given gas stations’ customer base (ς in our
theoretical model) is proportional to the measure of young inhabitants, SOY . The best case
for a U-shaped relation between SOY and average price results from a mapping from SOY
to the coeﬃcient on propensity to search which places the distribution of ς (see the lower
right panel of Figure 2) around the minimum of the U-shaped relation between ς and E(p).
Figure 5 reports the results of this exercise. Suppose that ς =SOY /1.8. Then the
distribution of ς is approximated by the kernel density distribution found in both panels of
Figure 5. For the relevant range of ς, we obtain a range of predicted expected prices given
by the U-shaped curve on the left-hand panel. This is taken from Figure 2, which in turn
refers to the equilibrium of the endogenous-search model with n = 2 and r normalized to 1.
The implied range of price variation is about one percent of r, which in turn corresponds
to two thirds of 1 cent of an euro. This value is lower than the value implied by our reduced-
form regressions, but of the same order of magnitude.
An additional sanity check is to evaluate the measure of searchers implied by the pro-
posed values of ς. This is shown on the right-hand panel of Figure 5. As can be seen, the
measure of searchers varies from about 25 to about 35 percent.
Is this a reasonable range for the fraction of searchers in equilibrium? As mentioned
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earlier, the German Cartel Oﬃce’s website provides a list of price-search apps as well as
an estimate of the number of downloads per app.22 A total of 57 apps are listed, of which
download estimates are available for 25. For each of these, we obtain a lower bound and an
upper bound of the number of downloads. The sum of the lower bounds is given by 4.56
million, whereas the sum of the upper bounds is given by 19.2 million. Considering that we
only have data for 25 out of 57 apps, we might extrapolate these bounds by multiplying by
the factor 57/25. This gives 10.4 million (lower bound) and 43.8 million. In order to get
an idea of scale, note that the total number of registered cars in Germany is given by 45.8
million.23
There are reasons to believe the upper bound 43.8 million overestimates the total number
of downloads. For example, apps with missing data are likely to be smaller than apps for
which data is available. Moreover, some users may have downloaded more than one app,
so the number of downloads may overestimate the number of users who have downloaded
apps. Against that, we should also consider the fact that car usage is not uniform; and that
app downloaders are likely to have purchased diesel more frequently than average.
The mere fact a user downloads an app does not mean he or she is a searcher: a searcher
is someone who downloads an app and uses it. As mentioned earlier, we have data on usage
for a particular app, Tank-Navigator. From June 18, 2014 to October 16, 2016 (2.33 years)
we observe 1,914,096 queries, or 821,500 per year. Considering that the number of app
downloads varies from 100 and 500 thousand, this corresponds to 8.21 or 1.64 queries per
user per year.
Taking the simple average of the above two numbers, we get an estimate of 4.9 queries
per user per year. The average number of visits to the pump is given by 26.9 times per
year.24 Assuming that search implies one query per refueling event, we estimate that about
18% of refueling events are associated with a price query.
Due to limited data availability, these calculations are very gross. That said, considering
the order of magnitude of our estimates of searchers; considering the relation between search
activity and user age; and considering the geographical variation in age, we believe that
the eﬀect identiﬁed by our theoretical model plausibly is also present in the data and is
identiﬁed by the cross-sectional variation in our age variable.
7. Conclusion
This paper makes both a conceptual and an empirical contribution. At the conceptual
level, we propose a new approach to the problem of tacit collusion. The vast majority
of the IO literature has focused on the issue of sustainability of collusion. One criticism
of this approach is that, in the words of Harrington (2015), “many industries which could
sustain a collusive arrangement, do not; and there are many instances of cartels which could
have eﬀectively operated prior to when the cartel was formed but did not.” Motivated by
this criticism, we propose a diﬀerent approach to tacit collusion, one that focuses on the
22. See http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/EN/Economicsectors/MineralOil/MTU-
Fuels/mtufuels node.html.
23. See www.kba.de/DE/Statistik/Fahrzeuge/Bestand/bestand node.html#rechts.
24. This data was obtained from “Gesellschaft fu¨r Konsumforschung (GfK)” (2012), a report by GfK
Tankstellenpanel Deutschland, a major consumer research corporation. See
www.gfkps.com/imperia/md/content/ps de/tankstellenpanel/gfk tankstellenpanel vortrag 29 februar 2012.pdf.
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participation constraint rather than the incentive (no-deviation) constraint. An application
of this approach to the problem of search suggests a U-shaped relation between the measure
of searchers and equilibrium price.
The second contribution of the paper is to present empirical evidence of a U-shaped
relationship between the measure of propensity to search and price. We do so with retail
diesel data from Dortmund gas stations. Our empirical results are consistent with theory:
we estimate a U-shaped relationship with statistical precision. Moreover, we show that the
range of variation in customer search is associated with a price variation of about 2.5 cents
per liter (about 5% of sale price). Adding to this, we ﬁnd evidence for an increasing prob-
ability of collusion when search intensity increases, which furthermore leads to increasing
price dispersion.
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